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Advocates seeking indigent defense reform have often
relied on civil litigation to prospectively enforce the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and to attack structural
deficiencies of indigent defense systems-such as under-
funding-that are likely to lead to system-wide ineffective
assistance. Although the United States Supreme Court has
addressed myriad aspects of postconviction ineffective
assistance of counsel claims made in the criminal context,
particularly in the last decade or so,' many of these cases
have had little direct bearing on the way in which advocates
have attempted to enforce the Sixth Amendment in the civil
context. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed
structural ineffective assistance of counsel claims or the
standard that should be applied to such claims.
The Court's most recentcases in its right to counsel line
of jurisprudence are no different in that they address
neither civil right to counsel claims nor prospective
enforcement of the Sixth Amendment. However, the way in
which they redefine the Sixth Amendment's relevance
pretrial and their pragmatic approach to criminal justice
issues may have the unintended effect of paving an easier
road to the vindication of structural claims in the civil
context.
I. Treatment of Structural Ineffective Assistance Claims
in the Civil Context
The theory underlying civil claims alleging structural
violations of the right to counsel is typically that systemic
deficiencies present throughout a public defense system-
which may include inadequate resources, delays in the
appointment of counsel, inadequate attorney supervision,
or crushing public defender caseloads-deny indigent
defendants their right to counsel (or to the effective assis-
tance of counsel) in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Such claims are often brought as class action lawsuits,
banding together all indigent defendants who have been
charged or who will be charged in the future with criminal
offenses that make them eligible for incarceration (but who
have not yet been convicted or sentenced), thus subjecting
them to the indigent defense system at issue now or
sometime in the future. The aim in such cases is to show that
the indigent defense system is so inherently dysfunctional-
and the flaws of that system so universally apparent-that
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any indigent defendant subject to that system is likely to
receive ineffective assistance, regardless of the other factors
present in his or her individual criminal case.
Given the difference in posture and nature between
these claims and postconviction ineffective assistance
claims raised in the criminal context, courts faced with such
claims have had to decide what standard to apply. In the
criminal context, courts have typically analyzed ineffective
assistance of counsel claims by applying the standard set
forth in Strickland v. Washington,2 asking whether counsel's
conduct was deficient (i.e., was it reasonable under pre-
vailing professional norms) and whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such conduct (i.e, but for counsel's deficient
conduct, is there a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different).3
In contrast, many of the courts analyzing prospective
claims of ineffective assistance in the civil context have
eschewed that standard in favor of a different standard. The
dominant approach to such claims is set forth in Luckey v.
Harris,4 a case decided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Because the plaintiffs in Luckey were seeking
prospective enforcement of their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the Luckey court applied the standard used to
assess claims for injunctive relief, requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate "the likelihood of substantial and immediate
irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law." 6
The Luckey court and others following in its stead have
expressly rejected the application of the Strickland standard
to this context, reasoning that the factors favoring defer-
ential analysis of counsel's performance in the postconvic-
tion context-"concerns for finality, concern that extensive
post-trial burdens would discourage counsel from accept-
ing cases, and concern for the independence. of counsel"-
do not apply where prospective relief is being sought.7
II. The Court's Broader Conception of the Right to
Counsel and Its Implications for Structural Claims
The Court's recent Sixth Amendment cases do not address
either systemic or prospective claims, but their approach to
the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel does indirectly
provide some encouragement for civil plaintiffs litigating
structural ineffectiveness claims. In particular, the Court's
recognition that the right to counsel is not equated with the
right to a fair trial (and, as a result, we can conceive of Sixth
Amendment harm or injury that may not relate to the trial
or trial outcomes), the Court's willingness to recognize
specific pretrial duties that counsel must fulfill, and the
Court's pragmatic approach to the functioning of the
criminal justice system, are all helpful to plaintiffs
attempting to show that structural deficiencies are likely to
lead to Sixth Amendment violations in the future.
In Missouri v. Frye,8 the Court held that counsel's failure
to inform his client of a favorable plea offer constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.9 In doing so, the Court
made the important holding-necessary to its analysis in
Lafler v. Cooper,'0 decided the same day-that the right to
counsel extends to the negotiation and consideration of plea
offers that lapse or are rejected." In Lafler, the Court held
that the petitioner had been prejudiced by counsel's defi-
cient performance in erroneously advising the petitioner to
reject a pending plea offer and proceed to trial (following
trial, the petitioner had been convicted and sentenced
accordingly).' 2 Ultimately, the Lafler Court rejected the
government's position that "[a] fair trial wipes clean any
deficient performance by defense counsel during plea
bargaining."' 3
First and foremost, these recent Court holdings
establish that the right to counsel guarantees more than just
the right to a fair trial.' 4 Perhaps the most significant con-
tribution of Lafler and Frye to Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence is that they have redefined the Sixth Amendment as
focused not solely on the reliability of the ultimate verdict
and the fairness of the trial itself, but instead on the
procedural fairness of the adversarial process preceding the
trial.'5 This key aspect of their holdings is relevant to
structural ineffective assistance claims in two ways. First, it
emphasizes the importance of enforcing the right to
counsel not only in relation to the trial, but in relation to all
of the "critical stages" preceding it.' 6 In other words, the
Court is concerned not just with counsel's ability to
effectively perform aspects of representation that will bear
directly on issues of guilt or innocence or that will have
a direct bearing on the trial, but further requires effective
assistance with regard to any pretrial duty performed dur-
ing a "critical stage." Second, it reconceives the range of
"outcomes" that may be relevant under the Strickland
standard, making it possible for a defendant to demonstrate
ineffective assistance not only by demonstrating that
counsel's deficient conduct made his conviction more likely
than not, but also by demonstrating that had counsel pro-
vided effective assistance at an earlier critical stage, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of that stage itself
would have been different. For example, although errors
committed by counsel during voir dire allowing biased
jurors on the jury or the failure to challenge racially moti-
vated strikes by the prosecution may not undermine the
ultimate reliability of the trial, under the Lafler and Frye
approach, the defendant need not demonstrate an effect on
the ultimate finding of guilt, but may instead demonstrate
that but for counsel's deficient conduct, there is
a reasonable probability that he would have been tried by
a different jury.'7 By broadening the right to counsel's scope
of applicability and the means by which ineffective assis-
tance can be demonstrated, these decisions provide civil
plaintiffs with a broader definition of potential injury,
expanding both when and how it might occur and thus the
number of ways in which structural deficiencies might lead
to its potential infliction.
In making this leap, the Lafler-Frye Court did not go so
far as to eliminate Strickland's prejudice requirement; the
Court was very clear in confining itself to Strickland's two-
prong inquiry. In that respect, it cannot provide any clear
support for the inapplicability of that standard in the pro-
spective enforcement context, nor can it provide anything
but very indirect support for the idea that Strickland's
prejudice requirement should not apply at all to prospective
claims for relief. 8 The Court was very clear, however, that it
values not only that conduct of counsel which bears on the
outcome of the trial itself or on the specific question of
guilt, but also that conduct which "undermine[s] the proper
functioning of the adversarial process" and that "which
cause[s] the defendant to lose benefits he would have
received in the ordinary course but for counsel's ineffective
assistance.' 9 So, the definition of possible injury resulting
from counsel's deficient conduct is no longer limited solely
to conviction or a harsher sentence; instead, it may take
a variety of forms, including the missed opportunity to
accept a plea offer. Translated to the civil context, where an
indigent defendant-plaintiff must demonstrate "the likeli-
hood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury" to
prove a prospective claim for relief, a plaintiff need no
longer demonstrate that systemic deficiencies would make
conviction more likely than not, but instead has a broader
range of outcomes on which to measure the effect of
counsel's potential shortcomings. Whereas it may be diffi-
cult for civil claimants to draw a direct connection between
systemic deficiencies and trial outcomes, given the myriad
factors that may intervene in the interim, it will be a less
daunting task for those same claimants to demonstrate how
systemic deficiencies will inevitably result in missed
opportunities or "los[t] benefits"-such as missed filing
deadlines or the failure to file specific pretrial motions-
resulting from a lack of time or resources.
Additionally, in these and other recent cases, the Court
has demonstrated a willingness to indirectly impose pro-
spective duties on counsel during pretrial proceedings. At
the very least, the Court has recognized that a fair trial
cannot substitute for duties that go unfulfilled pretrial, and
that when specific duties are not fulfilled, the Court will
make a de facto finding of deficient performance. Although
not a severe departure from past precedent, this does cut
back some on the view expressed in Strickland that "the
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms" and
that "[m]ore specific guidelines are not appropriate .. .20
For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky,"' the Court held that
counsel has a duty to advise her client of the collateral
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consequences of a guilty plea,22 and in Missouri v. Frye,2 3
the Court held that defense counsel has a duty to commu-
nicate to her client the terms of a plea offer made by the
prosecution.2 4 In earlier cases, like Wiggins v. Smith25 and
Rompilla v. Beard,26 the Court made clear defense counsel's
responsibility to conduct pretrial mitigation investigation in
capital cases. Thus, the Court has provided some recogni-
tion, albeit in limited circumstances, that the effective
assistance of counsel can in some respects be boiled down
to discrete duties that counsel must fulfill in every case.
These duties-some of which the Court has already
imposed and others that it easily could in future cases-are
often made impossible by structural deficiencies, such as
severe underfunding or public defenders carrying crushing
caseloads. The further the Court continues down this path
of identifying specific pretrial duties-by finding the failure
to fulfill the duty adequate grounds for deficient perfor-
mance-and to the extent systemic deficiencies make any
of these duties all but impossible to fulfill, it will be a much
clearer path toward arguing that those deficiencies lead to
an increased "likelihood of substantial and immediate
irreparable injury."
Last, the Court's recent opinions in this area have taken
a pragmatic rather than formalist approach to enforcing the
right to counsel. In Frye, the Court recognized that, given
the centrality of plea bargaining, "ijn today's criminal
justice system.., the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical
point for a defendant."2 7 Similarly, in Lafler, the Court
acknowledged the "reality" that most criminal cases are
resolved by pleas, and that for the right to effective assis-
tance to have any force, it would have to have real meaning
in the plea bargaining context.28 In Maples v. Thomas,' 9 the
Court reasoned that a capital defendant who is represented
by counsel in name only may, as a practical matter, have
been abandoned by counsel for purposes of overcoming
procedural default.30 That same pragmatism would be
welcomed in the civil context where courts may be making
decisions about whether, in practice, a lawyer who is paid
a nominal sum to handle a criminal case or appeal would be
in any position to offer effective assistance, or whether
a system that drastically undercompensates attorneys will
be able to attract competent counsel or counsel who can
afford to spend the requisite amount of time on their
appointed (vs. private) cases. For example, in Simmons v.
State Public Defender,3' the Iowa Supreme Court held that
a $1500 fee cap on court-appointed appeals "would in many
cases substantially undermine the right of indigents to the
effective assistance of counsel." 32 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court reasoned that a lawyer working under such
a fee system would find it difficult to make a living, that the
fee cap would have a chilling effect on qualified lawyers
accepting such appointed cases, and that paying such a low
fee for appointed cases would pit a lawyer's economic
interests against the dient's interest in effective represen-
tation.33 To the extent the Court's reasoning in its more
recent cases encourages other courts to adopt a similarly
pragmatic view in giving meaning to the Sixth Amend-
ment-for example, by recognizing that counsel cannot
fulfill certain duties without access to adequate resources-
it will benefit indigent defendants litigating civil right to
counsel claims.
Ill. Conclusion: An Easier Road Ahead for Civil
Claimants?
In the wake of the Supreme Court's last term, it is likely that
many will focus on Lafler and Frye's capability to expand the
universe of possible criminal ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Their lesser considered impact may be on
structural right to counsel claims and the way in which the
Court's reasoning provides civil claimants with additional
ways in which to establish their entitlement to prospective
relief based on systemic deficiencies.
The Court is unlikely to chime in about the appropriate
standard to be applied in these cases, and its blind adher-
ence to the Strickland framework may make it difficult to
conceive of it endorsing Strickland's total abandonment,
even in the civil context. But, its evolved understanding of
the Sixth Amendment-its reach, its applicability to the
pretrial context, and its ability to articulate specific pretrial
duties of counsel-will be helpful nonetheless to civil
claimants needing to show a link between system-wide
deficiencies and the likelihood that counsel will not be in
a position to provide effective assistance in the future.
The right to counsel that exists in the wake of Lafler and
Frye is a more robust version of the pretrial right to counsel,
broadening the range of opportunities for defendants to
enforce that right and the means by which counsel's pretrial
effectiveness may be assessed. The Court's demonstrated
willingness to depart from a purely trial-centered definition
of Sixth Amendment injury, to expect a certain level of
conduct from counsel even when that conduct does not
bear on the trial itself, and to take a more pragmatic
approach to effectuate the Sixth Amendment right suggests
an easier path for indigent defendants hoping to vindicate
their right to counsel through structural challenges made in
the civil context.
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